Appl. No. Filed

10/063,563

May 2, 2002

DELETION OF INVENTORS

Please correct the inventorship under 37 CFR §1.48(b) by removing the following inventors from the present application:

Dan L. Eaton,

Ellen Filvaroff,

Mary E. Gerritsen and

Colin K. Watanabe

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REMARKS

Claim 1 has been amended, and Claim 6 has been cancelled. Claims 1-5 are therefore present for further examination. Applicants maintain that the cancellation of a claim makes no admission as to its patentability and reserve the right to pursue the subject matter of the cancelled claim in this or any other patent application.

Priority Determination

The PTO has stated that the subject matter defined in the present application is not supported by the disclosure in any of the applications for which Applicants claim priority because the claimed subject matter does not have utility, enablement, or written description. The priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 is therefore set at the instant filing date, May 2, 2002.

Applicants have previously listed the priority information for the instant application in a Preliminary Amendment mailed September 3, 2002. The preliminary amendment states that the instant application is a continuation of, and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to, US Application 10/006867 filed 12/6/2001, which is a continuation of, and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to, PCT Application PCT/US00/23328 filed 8/24/2000, with is a continuation-in-part of, and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to, US Application 09/380137 filed 8/25/1999, which is the National Stage filed under 35 U.S.C. § 371 of PCT Application PCT/US99/12252 filed 6/2/1999, which claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 to US Provisional Application 60/088811 filed 6/10/1998.

The sequence of SEQ ID NO:44 was first disclosed in US Provisional Application 60/088811 filed 6/10/1998 in Figure 2 and SEQ ID NO:3. The data in Example 18 (Tumor Versus Normal Differential Tissue Expression Distribution), relied on in part for the utility of the claimed antibodies, were first disclosed in PCT Application PCT/US00/23328 filed 8/24/2000, on page 93, line 3, through page 96, line 35. For the reasons detailed below, Applicants submit they are entitled to at least the priority date of August 24, 2000.

Amendments to the Specification

Applicants have amended the title and abstract to be clearly indicative of the invention to which the claims are directed, as required by the Examiner.

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Applicants have also amended the specification to recognize the trademark $ATCC^{TM}$ and other trademarks, and to remove browser-executable code.

Information Disclosure Statement

Applicants submit herewith a Supplemental Information Disclosure Statement. I

addition to disclosing several references, the form is being submitted to correct a typographical

error in the form PTO-1449 submitted on September 6, 2002. Patent No. 5,546,637 should have

been listed as Patent No. 5,536,637. A copy of Patent No. 5,536,637, the correct patent, was

submitted with the original form PTO-1449 in September, 2002.

In addition, Applicants submit herewith additional information on the publication dates of

the sequences submitted in the BLAST results, to allow the Examiner to determine whether the

sequences constitute prior art.

Claim Objections

The claims are objected to for improperly referencing the Figures. Applicants have

amended the claims to remove reference to the Figures.

Correction of Inventorship under 37 CFR §1.48(b)

Applicant requests that several inventors be deleted, as these inventors' inventions are no

longer being claimed in the present application as a result of prosecution. The fee as set forth in

§ 1.17(i) is submitted herewith.

Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. §101 – Utility

The Examiner rejects Claims 1-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as lacking patentable utility. The

PTO states that the claimed invention is not supported by a specific, substantial and credible

utility, or in the alternative, a well-established utility.

The PTO asserts that the polypeptide shown in Figure 44 (SEQ ID NO:44) is a totally new,

uncharacterized polypeptide, as the specification fails to disclose any secondary or tertiary structure,

nor any homology with known polypeptides. There is allegedly no disclosure of biological activity,

subcellular location, or the physiological significance of the polypeptide. The PTO rejects the

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asserted utilities, stating that further research is necessary to confirm a "real world" utility for the PRO1003 polypeptide and claimed antibodies.

The PTO acknowledges that the nucleic acid encoding PRO1003 was reported to be more highly expressed in normal stomach and skin as compared to stomach tumor and melanoma, and in lung tumor as compared to normal lung. However, the PTO states that the specification fails to disclose the number of samples tested, the statistical significance of the results, and the specific probe used for the analysis performed. The PTO believes that one of ordinary skill in the art "could not distinguish tumors from non-tumors based on the alleged 'more highly expressed' criteria only." Office Action at 7.

The PTO relies on Hu et al., in support of its position that further research would be required to establish the statistical significance of the data provided, and whether and how a probe used in the PCR assay could be used as a diagnostic marker or therapeutic target. The PTO states that Hu et al. makes it clear that such results are to be evaluated "very critically." The PTO cites Pennica et al. as demonstrating that gene amplification does not correlate with protein levels, and Haynes et al. for showing that polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels. The PTO cites Konopka et al. as stating "Protein expression is not related to amplification of the abl gene but to variation in the level of bcr-abl mRNA production from a single Ph1 template." The PTO also states that "the lack of demonstrable correlation of mRNA expression levels with protein levels are so well known in the art at the time of filing, it was reported in a general text book" and cites Genes VI, Chapter 29 (Benjamin Lewin, Genes VI (1997)). Additional support is allegedly found in Gokman-Polar et al. The PTO concludes that given the totality of the evidence provided, "it is clear that those skilled in the art would not assume that an alleged increase in gene copy number or increase in mRNA levels would correlate with increased polypeptide levels." Office Action at 9.

Utility - Legal Standard

According to the Utility Examination Guidelines ("Utility Guidelines"), 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (2001) an invention complies with the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, if it has at least one asserted "specific, substantial, and credible utility" or a "well-established utility."

Under the Utility Guidelines, a utility is "specific" when it is particular to the subject matter claimed. For example, it is generally not enough to state that a nucleic acid is useful as a diagnostic tool without also identifying the condition that is to be diagnosed.

The requirement of "substantial utility" defines a "real world" use, and derives from the Supreme Court's holding in *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) stating that "The basic *quid pro quo* contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility." In explaining the "substantial utility" standard, M.P.E.P. § 2107.01 cautions, however, that Office personnel must be careful not to interpret the phrase "immediate benefit to the public" or similar formulations used in certain court decisions to mean that products or services based on the claimed invention must be "currently available" to the public in order to satisfy the utility requirement. "Rather, <u>any reasonable use</u> that an applicant has identified for the invention that can be viewed as providing a public benefit should be accepted as sufficient, at least with regard to defining a 'substantial' utility." (M.P.E.P. § 2107.01, emphasis added).

The mere consideration that further experimentation might be performed to more fully develop the claimed subject matter does not support a finding of lack of utility. M.P.E.P. § 2107.01 III cites *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995) in stating that "Usefulness in patent law ... necessarily includes the expectation of further research and development. The stage at which an invention in this field becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans." Further, "[T]o violate § 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result" *Juicy Whip Inc. v. Orange Bang Inc.*, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999), citing Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

Indeed, the Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance With the Utility Requirement, set forth in M.P.E.P. § 2107 II(B)(1) gives the following instruction to patent examiners: "If the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention is useful for any particular practical purpose ... and the assertion would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, do not impose a rejection based on lack of utility."

Finally, in assessing the credibility of the asserted utility, the M.P.E.P. states that "to overcome the presumption of truth that an assertion of utility by the applicant enjoys" the PTO must establish that it is "more likely than not that one of ordinary skill in the art would doubt

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(i.e., "question") the truth of the statement of utility." M.P.E.P. § 2107.02 III A. The M.P.E.P. cautions that:

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 have been rarely sustained by federal courts. Generally speaking, in these rare cases, the 35 U.S.C. 101 rejection was sustained [] because the applicant ... asserted a utility that could only be true if it violated a scientific principle, such as the second law of thermodynamics, or a law of nature, or was wholly inconsistent with contemporary knowledge in the art. M.P.E.P. § 2107.02 III B., citing In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978, 154 U.S.P.Q. 92, 96 (CCPA 1967) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added).

<u>Utility need NOT be Proved to a Statistical Certainty – a Reasonable Correlation between the Evidence and the Asserted Utility is Sufficient</u>

An Applicant's assertion of utility creates a presumption of utility that will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, "unless there is a reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope." In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391, 183 USPQ 288, 297 (CCPA 1974). See, also In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 206 USPQ 885 (CCPA 1980); In re Irons, 340 F.2d 974, 144 USPQ 351 (1965); In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159, 196 USPQ 209, 212-13 (CCPA 1977). Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of fact. Raytheon v. Roper, 724 F.2d 951, 956, 220 USPQ 592, 596 (Fed. Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 469 US 835 (1984). The evidentiary standard to be used throughout ex parte examination in setting forth a rejection is a preponderance of the evidence, or "more likely than not" standard. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This is stated explicitly in the M.P.E.P.:

[T]he applicant does not have to provide evidence sufficient to establish that an asserted utility is true "beyond a reasonable doubt." Nor must the applicant provide evidence such that it establishes an asserted utility as a matter of statistical certainty. Instead, evidence will be sufficient if, considered as a whole, it leads a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the asserted utility is more likely than not true. M.P.E.P. at § 2107.02, part VII (2004) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

The PTO has the initial burden to offer evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility." *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Only then does the burden shift to the Applicant to provide rebuttal evidence. *Id.* As stated in the M.P.E.P., such rebuttal evidence does not need to absolutely prove

that the asserted utility is real. Rather, the evidence only needs to be reasonably indicative of the asserted utility.

In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a PTO decision that *in vitro* testing of a novel pharmaceutical compound was sufficient to establish practical utility, stating the following rule:

[T]esting is often required to establish practical utility. But the test results **need not absolutely prove** that the compound is pharmacologically active. All that is required is that the tests be "reasonably indicative of the desired [pharmacological] response." In other words, there must be a sufficient correlation between the tests and an asserted pharmacological activity so as to convince those skilled in the art, to a reasonable probability, that the novel compound will exhibit the asserted pharmacological behavior." Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted, bold emphasis added, italics in original).

While the *Fujikawa* case was in the context of utility for pharmaceutical compounds, the principals stated by the Court are applicable in the instant case where the asserted utility is for a therapeutic and diagnostic use – utility does not have to be established to an absolute certainty, rather, the evidence must convince a person of skill in the art "to a reasonable probability." In addition, the evidence need not be direct, so long as there is a "sufficient correlation" between the tests performed and the asserted utility.

The Court in *Fujikawa* relied in part on its decision in *Cross v. Iizuka*, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In *Cross*, the Appellant argued that basic *in vitro* tests conducted in cellular fractions did not establish a practical utility for the claimed compounds. Appellant argued that more sophisticated *in vitro* tests using intact cells, or *in vivo* tests, were necessary to establish a practical utility. The Court in *Cross* rejected this argument, instead favoring the argument of the Appellee:

[I]n vitro results...are generally predictive of in vivo test results, i.e., there is a reasonable correlation therebetween. Were this not so, the testing procedures of the pharmaceutical industry would not be as they are. [Appellee] has not urged, and rightly so, that there is an invariable exact correlation between in vitro test results and in vivo test results. Rather, [Appellee's] position is that successful in vitro testing for a particular pharmacological activity establishes a significant probability that in vivo testing for this particular pharmacological activity will be successful. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).

The Cross case is very similar to the present case. Like in vitro testing in the pharmaceutical industry, those of skill in the field of biotechnology rely on the reasonable correlation that exists between gene expression and protein expression (see below). Were there no reasonable correlation between the two, the techniques that measure gene levels such as microarray analysis, differential display, and quantitative PCR would not be so widely used by those in the art. As in Cross, Applicants here do not argue that there is "an invariable exact correlation" between gene expression and protein expression. Instead, Applicants' position detailed below is that a measured change in gene expression in cancer cells establishes a "significant probability" that the expression of the encoded polypeptide in cancer will also be changed based on "a reasonable correlation therebetween."

Taken together, the legal standard for demonstrating utility is a relatively low hurdle. An Applicant need only provide evidence such that it is more likely than not that a person of skill in the art would be convinced, to a reasonable probability, that the asserted utility is true. The evidence need not be direct evidence, so long as there is a reasonable correlation between the evidence and the asserted utility. The Applicant does not need to provide evidence such that it establishes an asserted utility as a matter of statistical certainty.

Even assuming that the PTO has met its initial burden to offer evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the truth of the asserted utility, Applicants assert that they have met their burden of providing rebuttal evidence such that it is more likely than not those skilled in the art, to a reasonable probability, would believe that the claimed invention is useful as a diagnostic tool for cancer.

Substantial Utility

The Data in Example 18 are Data Regarding Differential mRNA Levels, not Gene Amplification

Applicants begin by clarifying that the data concerning the differential expression of the PRO1003 gene presented in Example 18 relate to gene expression, not gene amplification. The description of Example 18 makes clear that the results were obtained by quantitative PCR amplification of cDNA libraries. It is well known in the art that cDNA libraries are made from mRNA, and reflect the level of mRNA for a particular gene in the source tissue. Thus, Example 18 is reporting a measure of the expression of the PRO1003 gene, i.e. mRNA levels, not its amplification, i.e. the number of copies of PRO1003 in the genome.

The PTO cites Pennica et al. as demonstrating that "gene amplification does not correlate with the protein levels." Office Action at 8 (emphasis added). Applicants point out that whether or not gene amplification leads to increased gene expression is irrelevant to this particular application. Likewise, whether the differential mRNA expression of the PRO1003 gene reported in Example 18 is due to an increase or decrease in copy number, or alternatively due to an increase or decrease in transcription rates is simply not relevant. Applicants have provided reliable evidence that the PRO1003 mRNA is differentially expressed in certain tumors. Whether this differential expression is due to changes in gene copy number, transcription rates, a combination of the two, or some other known or unknown cellular mechanism is simply not relevant to Applicants' asserted utility.

Summary of Applicants' Arguments and the PTO's Response

In an attempt to clarify Applicants' argument, Applicants offer a summary of their argument and the disputed issues involved. Applicants assert that the claimed antibodies have utility as diagnostic and therapeutic tools for cancer, particularly stomach, melanoma and lung cancer. Applicants are not asserting that the claimed antibodies necessarily provide a definitive diagnosis of cancer, but rather that they are useful, alone or in combination with other diagnostic tools, to assist in the diagnosis of certain cancers. Applicants' asserted utility rests on the following argument:

- 1. Applicants have provided reliable evidence that mRNA for the PRO1003 polypeptide is expressed at least two-fold higher in normal stomach, normal skin and lung tumor tissue than in stomach and melanoma tumor, and normal lung, respectively;
- 2. Applicants assert that it is well-established in the art that a change in the level of mRNA for a particular protein, e.g. an increase, generally leads to a corresponding change in the level of the encoded protein, e.g. an increase;
- 3. Given Applicants' evidence that the level of mRNA for the PRO1003 polypeptide is decreased in stomach and melanoma tumors and normal lung compared to normal stomach and skin tissue and lung tumor, respectively, it is more likely than not that the PRO1003 polypeptide is expressed at decreased levels in stomach and melanoma tumors and normal lung compared to normal stomach and skin tissue, and lung tumor tissue, respectively;

4. Antibodies to proteins which are differentially expressed in certain tumors are useful as diagnostic and therapeutic tools.

Applicants understand the PTO to be making several arguments in response to Applicants' asserted utility:

- 1. The PTO has challenged the reliability of the evidence reported in Example 18;
- 2. The PTO cites Pennica et al., Hu et al., Haynes et al., Konopoka et al., Lewin (Genes VI) and Gokman-Polar et al. to support the position that gene amplification is not necessarily correlated to gene expression, that the literature cautions against drawing conclusions based on small changes in transcript expression levels between normal and cancerous tissue, and that mRNA levels are not predictive of protein levels;
- 3. The PTO concludes that based on the cited literature, one of skill in the art would not assume that higher expression of mRNA would correlate with increased polypeptide levels. Therefore, further research needs to be done to determine if the increase or decrease in PRO1003 DNA supports a role for the peptide in cancerous tissue.

As detailed below, Applicants submit that the PTO has failed to demonstrate that this is one of the "rare cases" where the applicants have "asserted a utility that could only be true if it violated a scientific principle, such as the second law of thermodynamics, or a law of nature, or was wholly inconsistent with contemporary knowledge in the art." M.P.E.P. § 2107.02 III B. First, the PTO has failed to offer any evidence to support its rejection of the data in Example 18 and the Declaration of Chris Grimaldi in support of these data. Second, as discussed above and can be seen from Applicants' summary of their argument, Applicants submit that any lack of correlation between gene amplification and gene expression is not at issue in this application and therefore the Pennica et al. reference is not relevant. Third, Applicants submit that the Haynes et al., Hu et al., Konopoka et al., Lewin and Gokman-Polar et al. references are not contrary to Applicants' arguments, and therefore are not evidence to support the PTO's position. Finally, even if the PTO has met its initial burden, Applicants have submitted enough rebuttal evidence such that it is more likely than not that a person of skill in the art would be convinced, to a reasonable probability, that the asserted utility is true. As stated above, Applicants' evidence need not be direct evidence, so long as there is a reasonable correlation between the evidence and the asserted utility. The standard is not absolute certainty.

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Applicants have established that the Gene Encoding the PRO1003 Polypeptide is Differentially Expressed in Certain Cancers compared to Normal Tissue

Applicants first address the PTO's argument that the evidence of differential expression of the gene encoding the PRO1003 polypeptide in stomach, lung and melanoma tumors is insufficient because it does not disclose the number of samples tested, the statistical significance of the results, and the specific probe used for the analysis. Applicants submit that the gene expression data provided in Example 18 of the present application are sufficient to establish that the PRO1003 gene is differentially expressed in stomach, lung and melanoma tumors.

The gene expression data in the specification, Example 18, shows that the mRNA associated with protein PRO1003 was more highly expressed in normal stomach and skin tissue and lung tumor tissue than in stomach and melanoma tumor, and normal lung tissue. Gene expression was analyzed using standard semi-quantitative PCR amplification reactions of cDNA libraries isolated from different human tumor and normal human tissue samples. Identification of the differential expression of the PRO1003 polypeptide-encoding gene in tumor tissue compared to the corresponding normal tissue renders the molecule useful as a diagnostic tool for the determination of the presence or absence of tumor. Applicants submit herewith as Exhibit 1 a first Declaration of J. Christopher Grimaldi, an expert in the field of cancer biology. This declaration explains the importance of the data in Example 18, and how differential gene and protein expression studies are used to differentiate between normal and tumor tissue (see Declaration, paragraph 7).

In paragraph 5 of his declaration, Mr. Grimaldi states that the gene expression studies reported in Example 18 of the instant application were made from pooled samples of normal and of tumor tissues. Mr. Grimaldi explains that:

The DNA libraries used in the gene expression studies were made from pooled samples of normal and of tumor tissues. Data from pooled samples is more likely to be accurate than data obtained from a sample from a single individual. That is, the detection of variations in gene expression is likely to represent a more generally relevant condition when pooled samples from normal tissues are compared with pooled samples from tumors in the same tissue type. (Paragraph 5) (emphasis added).

In paragraphs 6 and 7, Mr. Grimaldi explains that the semi-quantitative analysis employed to generate the data of Example 18 is sufficient to determine if a gene is over- or under-expressed in tumor cells compared to corresponding normal tissue. He states that any

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visually detectable difference seen between two samples is indicative of at least a two-fold difference in cDNA between the tumor tissue and the counterpart normal tissue. Thus, the results of Example 18 reflect at least a two-fold difference between normal and tumor samples. He also states that the results of the gene expression studies indicate that the genes of interest "can be used to differentiate tumor from normal," thus establishing their reliability. He explains that, contrary to the PTO's assertions, "The precise levels of gene expression are irrelevant; what matters is that there is a relative difference in expression between normal tissue and tumor tissue." (Paragraph 7). Thus, since it is the relative level of expression between normal tissue and suspected cancerous tissue that is important, the precise level of expression in normal tissue is irrelevant. Likewise, there is no need for quantitative data to compare the level of expression in normal and tumor tissue. As Mr. Grimaldi states, "If a difference is detected, this indicates that the gene and its corresponding polypeptide and antibodies against the polypeptide are useful for diagnostic purposes, to screen samples to differentiate between normal and tumor."

Applicants submit that the declaration of Mr. Grimaldi is based on personal knowledge of the relevant facts at issue. Mr. Grimaldi is an expert in the field and conducted or supervised the experiments at issue. Applicants remind the PTO that "[o]ffice personnel must accept an opinion from a qualified expert that is based upon relevant facts whose accuracy is not being questioned." PTO Utility Examination Guidelines (2001) (emphasis added). In addition, declarations relating to issues of fact should not be summarily dismissed as "opinions" without an adequate explanation of how the declaration fails to rebut the Examiner's position. In re Alton 76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Applicant's again point out that the data in Example 18 are gene expression data, not gene amplification data. The specification and the first Grimaldi Declaration make clear that Example 18 used semi-quantitative PCR of cDNA libraries. Therefore, one of skill in the art would know that Example 18 is a measure of mRNA levels, and reflects differential PRO1003 gene expression, not gene amplification. As discussed above, the PTO cites Pennica et al. for support of the argument that gene amplification does not necessarily lead to increased gene expression. This reference is irrelevant to the instant application which reports differential gene expression, not gene amplification. Therefore, this reference does not support the PTO's challenge of the sufficiency of the Example 18 data, or the first Grimaldi Declaration.

The PTO also cites Hu et al. (J. Proteome Res., 2(4):405-12 (2003)) for support for its assertion the literature cautions researchers from drawing conclusions based on small changes in transcript expression levels between normal and cancerous tissue. The PTO states that Hu teaches that not all genes with increased expression in cancer have a known or published role in cancer.

In Hu, the researchers used an automated literature-mining tool to summarize and estimate the relative strengths of all human gene-disease relationships published on Medline. They then generated a microarray expression dataset comparing breast cancer and normal breast tissue. Using their data-mining tool, they looked for a correlation between the strength of the literature association between the gene and breast cancer, and the magnitude of the difference in expression level. They report that for genes displaying a 5-fold change or less in tumors compared to normal, there was no evidence of a correlation between altered gene expression and a known role in the disease. See Hu at 411. However, among genes with a 10-fold or more change in expression level, there was a strong correlation between expression level and a published role in the disease. Id. at 412. Importantly, Hu reports that the observed correlation was only found among estrogen receptor-positive tumors, not ER-negative tumors. Id.

The general findings of Hu are not surprising – one would expect that genes with the greatest change in expression in a disease would be the first targets of research, and therefore have the strongest known relationship to the disease as measured by the number of publications reporting a connection with the disease. The correlation reported in Hu only indicates that the greater the change in expression level, the more likely it is that there is a *published* or *known* role for the gene in the disease, as found by their automated literature-mining software. Thus, Hu's results merely reflect a bias in the literature toward studying the most prominent targets, and reflect nothing regarding the ability of a gene that is 2-fold or more differentially expressed in tumors to serve as a disease marker.

Hu acknowledges the shortcomings of this method in explaining the disparity in Hu's findings for ER-negative versus ER-positive tumors: Hu attributes the "bias in the literature" toward the more prevalent ER-positive tumors as the explanation for the lack of any correlation between number of publications and gene expression levels in less-prevalent (and, therefore, less studied) ER-negative tumors. *Id.* Because of this intrinsic bias, Hu's methodology is unlikely to ever note a correlation of a disease with less differentially-expressed genes and their

corresponding proteins, regardless of whether or not an actual relationship between the disease and less differentially-expressed genes exists. Accordingly, Hu's methodology yields results that provide little or no information regarding biological significance of genes with less than 5-fold expression change in disease. Nowhere in Hu does it say that a lack of correlation in their study means that genes with a less than five-fold change in level of expression in cancer cannot serve as molecular markers of cancer.

Applicants submit that a lack of known role for PRO1003 in cancer does not prevent its use as a diagnostic tool for cancer. There is a difference between use of a gene for distinguishing between tumor and normal tissue on the one hand, and establishing a role for the gene in cancer on the other. Genes with lower levels of change in expression may or may not be the most important genes in causing the disease, but the genes can still show a consistent and measurable change in expression. While such genes may or may not be good targets for further research, they can nonetheless be used as diagnostic tools. Thus, Hu does not refute the Applicants' assertion that the PRO1003 gene can be used as a cancer diagnostic tool because it is differentially expressed in certain tumors.

The position of the PTO is inconsistent with the analogous standard for therapeutic utility of a compound that "the mere <u>identification</u> of a pharmacological activity of a compound that is relevant to an asserted pharmacological use provides an 'immediate benefit to the public' and thus satisfies the utility requirement." M.P.E.P. §2701.01 (emphasis in original). Here, the mere identification of altered expression in tumors is relevant to the diagnosis of tumors, and, therefore, provides an immediate benefit to the public.

In conclusion, Applicants submit that the evidence reported in Example 18, combined with the first Grimaldi Declaration, establish that there is at least a two-fold difference in PRO1003 cDNA between normal stomach and skin tissue and lung tumor tissue compared to stomach and melanoma tumor, and normal lung tissue, respectively. Therefore, it follows that expression levels of the PRO1003 gene can be used to distinguish stomach, lung and melanoma tumor tissue from normal stomach, lung and skin tissue, respectively. The PTO has not offered any significant arguments or evidence to the contrary.

As Applicants explain below, it is more likely than not that the PRO1003 polypeptide can also be used to distinguish stomach, lung and melanoma tumor tissue from normal stomach, lung

and skin tissue, respectively. This provides utility for the claimed antibodies to the PRO1003 polypeptides.

Applicants have established that the Accepted Understanding in the Art is that there is a Positive Correlation between mRNA Levels and the Level of Expression of the Encoded Protein

Applicants next turn to the second portion of their argument in support of their asserted utility – that it is well-established in the art that a change in the level of mRNA for a particular protein, generally leads to a corresponding change in the level of the encoded protein; given Applicants' evidence of differential expression of the mRNA for the PRO1003 polypeptide in esophageal, lung and melanoma tumor, it is more likely than not that the PRO1003 polypeptide is differentially expressed; and antibodies to proteins differentially expressed in certain tumors have utility as diagnostic and therapeutic tools.

In response to Applicants' assertion, the PTO cites Haynes et al., Konopoka et al., Lewin and Gokman-Polar et al. as support for its argument that "increased mRNA production does not necessarily lead to increased protein production...." Office Action at 8. For the reasons discussed below, the cited references are not contrary to Applicants' asserted utility.

Haynes *et al.* studied whether there is a correlation between the level of mRNA expression and the level of protein expression for 80 selected genes from yeast. The genes were selected because they constituted a relatively homogeneous group with respect to predicted half-life and expression level of the protein products. *See* Haynes at 1863. Haynes <u>did not</u> examine whether a change in transcript level for a particular gene led to a change in the level of expression of the corresponding protein. Instead, Haynes determined whether the steady-state transcript level correlated with the steady-state level of the corresponding protein based on an analysis of 80 different genes.

Haynes reported to have "found a general trend but no strong correlation between protein and transcript levels (Fig. 1)." *Id.* However, a cursory inspection of Fig. 1 shows a clear correlation between the mRNA levels and protein levels measured. This correlation is confirmed by an inspection of the full-length research paper from which the data in Fig. 1 were derived, presented herein as Exhibit 2 (Gygi *et al.*, Molecular and Cellular Biology, Mar. 1999, 1720-1730). Gygi states that "there was a general trend of increased protein levels resulting from increased mRNA levels," with a correlation coefficient of 0.935, indicating a strong correlation. Gygi at 1726. Moreover, Gygi also states that the correlation is especially strong for highly

expressed mRNAs. *Id.* Considering that Example18 of the specification shows over-expression of PRO 1003 mRNA in normal stomach and skin and in lung tumor, Haynes and Gygi actually provide strong evidence in support of a general correlation between MRNA and protein levels.

The PTO focuses on the portion of Haynes where the authors reported that for some of the studied genes with equivalent mRNA levels, there were differences in corresponding protein expression, including some that varied by more than 50-fold. Similarly, Haynes reports that different proteins with similar expression levels were maintained by transcript levels that varied by as much as 40-fold. *Id.* Thus, Haynes showed that for one type of yeast, similar mRNA levels for different genes did not universally result in equivalent protein levels for the different gene products, and similar protein levels for different gene products did not universally result from equivalent mRNA levels for the different genes. These results are expected, since there are many factors that determine translation efficiency for a given transcript, or the half-life of the encoded protein. Not surprisingly, based on these results, Haynes concluded that protein levels cannot always be accurately predicted from the level of the corresponding mRNA transcript when looking at the level of transcripts across different genes.

Importantly, Haynes did <u>not</u> say that for a single gene, the level of mRNA transcript is not positively correlated with the level of protein expression. Applicants have asserted that increasing or decreasing the level of mRNA for the <u>same</u> gene leads to a increase or decrease for the corresponding protein. Haynes did <u>not</u> study this issue and says absolutely nothing about it. Therefore, Haynes is not inconsistent with or contradictory to the utility of the instant claims, and offers no support for the PTO's position.

The PTO also cites Konopka *et al.* for support for the assertion that polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels. The PTO cites the statement in Konopka that "protein expression is not related to amplification of the abl gene but to variation in the level of the bcr-abl mRNA produced from a single Ph1 template." These results presented in Konopka actually present strong evidence <u>in support of Applicants' position</u> that there is a general understanding in the art that levels of mRNA correlate with levels of the corresponding proteins. Konopka analyzed the expression patterns of a gene associated with certain cancers. The authors show a wide variation in the levels of the protein in various cell types, and find that this variation can be attributed to the levels of the corresponding mRNA in each cell type. See, Konopka, p. 4050. Konopka thus concludes, "these combined data suggest that differential bcr-abl mRNA

expression from a single gene template is responsible for the variable levels of P210^{c-abl} [the protein of interest] detected." *Id.*, p. 4051. Thus, far from supporting the PTO's assertion that it is not the norm that increased transcription leads to increased levels of the corresponding protein, Konopka strongly supports the opposite proposition asserted by Applicants - that the level of mRNA, more often than not, correlates with the level of the corresponding protein.

The Examiner also cites the textbook by Lewin as teaching that "... production of RNA cannot be inevitably be equated with production of protein" (page 487, column 2, last paragraph). Applicants note that the full statement from Lewin's textbook, Genes VI, (Benjamin Lewin, Genes VI (1997)) reads as follows: "having acknowledged that control of gene expression can occur at multiple stages, and that production of RNA cannot inevitably be equated with production of protein, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of regulatory events occur at the initiation of transcription." Genes VI at 847-848 (emphasis added). Further, Lewin goes on to state that transcription of a gene "is a major control point: probably it is the most common level of regulation." Id., emphasis added. This reference provides additional support for Applicants' position that that the accepted understanding in the art is that there is a reasonable correlation between gene expression and the level of the encoded protein. Applicants do not assert that protein expression is never regulated at the translation level (i.e., post-transcriptionally), but rather that, more often than not, regulation of protein expression occurs at the transcriptional level, making the level of mRNA a general indicator of the level of protein. Far from rebutting this assertion, Lewin in fact supports it by stating that regulation occurs at the transcriptional stage in the overwhelming majority of cases, and that transcription is the most common level of regulation.

According to the Examiner, the lack of correlation between mRNA and protein levels is confirmed by Gokman-Polar *et al.* (Cancer Research 61:1375-1381, 2001) that indicates the absence of any necessary correlation between increased mRNA levels and increased protein levels. With respect to the Gokman-Polar reference cited by the Examiner, the PTO relies on a statement from Gokman-Polar that "Quantitative reverse transcription-PCR analysis revealed that the PKC mRNA levels do not directly correlate with PKC protein levels, indicating that PKC isoenzyme expression is likely regulated at the posttranscriptional/translational level." Office Action at 9. However, a close review of the entire article indicates that with one exception, the trend in the data is that mRNA and protein levels are positively correlated, supporting Applicants

assertion that increased mRNA levels correlate with increased protein levels. In Figure 2, the protein level of two isozymes shows a decrease, while the third is increased. This same pattern is seen for the corresponding mRNA levels in Figure 6, although admittedly the increase in mRNA for the third isozyme is minimal. Similarly, comparing the protein levels of the three isozymes in Figure 4 to the corresponding mRNA levels in Figure 7, with one exception the mRNA levels are positively correlated to protein levels. While protein levels do not increase or decrease in direct proportion to the changes in mRNA, the trend in five of the six examples is that protein levels are positively correlated to mRNA levels. This evidence is hardly sufficient to establish that one of skill in the art would reasonably doubt that there is a reasonable correlation between mRNA levels and protein levels.

In support of the assertion that changes in mRNA are positively correlated to changes in protein levels, Applicants submit herewith as Exhibit 3 a copy of a second Declaration by J. Christopher Grimaldi, an expert in the field of cancer biology. As stated in paragraph 5 of the declaration, "Those who work in this field are well aware that in the vast majority of cases, when a gene is over-expressed...the gene product or polypeptide will also be over-expressed.... This same principal applies to gene under-expression." Further, "the detection of increased mRNA expression is expected to result in increased polypeptide expression, and the detection of decreased mRNA expression is expected to result in decreased polypeptide expression. The detection of increased or decreased polypeptide expression can be used for cancer diagnosis and treatment." The references cited in the declaration and submitted herewith support this statement.

Applicants also submit herewith as Exhibit 4 a copy of the declaration of Paul Polakis, Ph.D., also an expert in the field of cancer biology. As stated in paragraph 6 of his declaration:

Based on my own experience accumulated in more than 20 years of research, including the data discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above [showing a positive correlation between mRNA levels and encoded protein levels in the vast majority of cases] and my knowledge of the relevant scientific literature, it is my considered scientific opinion that for human genes, an increased level of mRNA in a tumor cell relative to a normal cell typically correlates to a similar increase in abundance of the encoded protein in the tumor cell relative to the normal cell. In fact, it remains a central dogma in molecular biology that increased mRNA levels are predictive of corresponding increased levels of the encoded protein. (Emphasis added).

Dr. Polakis acknowledges that there are published cases where such a correlation does not exist, but states that it is his opinion, based on over 20 years of scientific research, that "such reports are exceptions to the commonly understood general rule that increased mRNA levels are predictive of corresponding increased levels of the encoded protein." (Polakis Declaration, paragraph 6).

The statements of Grimaldi and Polakis are supported by the teachings in Molecular Biology of the Cell, a leading textbook in the field (Bruce Alberts, *et al.*, Molecular Biology of the Cell (3rd ed. 1994) (submitted herewith as Exhibit 5) and (4th ed. 2002) (submitted herewith as Exhibit 6)). Figure 9-2 of Exhibit 5 shows the steps at which eukaryotic gene expression can be controlled. The first step depicted is transcriptional control. Exhibit 5 provides that "[f]or most genes transcriptional controls are paramount. This makes sense because, of all the possible control points illustrated in Figure 9-2, only transcriptional control ensures that no superfluous intermediates are synthesized." Exhibit 5 at 403 (emphasis added). In addition, the text states that "Although controls on the initiation of gene transcription are the predominant form of regulation for most genes, other controls can act later in the pathway from RNA to protein to modulate the amount of gene product that is made." Exhibit 5 at 453 (emphasis added). Thus, as established in Exhibit 5, the predominant mechanism for regulating the amount of protein produced is by regulating transcription initiation.

In Exhibit 6, Figure 6-3 on page 302 illustrates the basic principle that there is a correlation between increased gene expression and increased protein expression. The accompanying text states that "a cell can change (or regulate) the expression of each of its genes according to the needs of the moment – most obviously by controlling the production of its mRNA." Exhibit 6 at 302 (emphasis added). Similarly, Figure 6-90 on page 364 of Exhibit 6 illustrates the path from gene to protein. The accompanying text states that while potentially each step can be regulated by the cell, "the initiation of transcription is the most common point for a cell to regulate the expression of each of its genes." Exhibit 6 at 364 (emphasis added). This point is repeated on page 379, where the authors state that of all the possible points for regulating protein expression, "[f]or most genes transcriptional controls are paramount." Exhibit 6 at 379 (emphasis added).

Further support for Applicants' position can be found in the Lewin textbook, Genes VI, cited by the PTO. As noted above, the reference states "having acknowledged that control of

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gene expression can occur at multiple stages, and that production of RNA cannot inevitably be equated with production of protein, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of regulatory events occur at the initiation of transcription." *Genes VI* at 847-848 (emphasis added).

Additional support is also found in Zhigang et al., World Journal of Surgical Oncology 2:13, 2004, submitted herewith as Exhibit 7. Zhigang studied the expression of prostate stem cell antigen (PSCA) protein and mRNA to validate it as a potential molecular target for diagnosis and treatment of human prostate cancer. The data showed "a high degree of correlation between PSCA protein and mRNA expression" Exhibit 7 at 4. Of the samples tested, 81 out of 87 showed a high degree of correlation between mRNA expression and protein expression. The authors conclude that "it is demonstrated that PSCA protein and mRNA overexpressed in human prostate cancer, and that the increased protein level of PSCA was resulted from the upregulated transcription of its mRNA." Exhibit 7 at 6. Even though the correlation between mRNA expression and protein expression occurred in 93% of the samples tested, not 100%, the authors state that "PSCA may be a promising molecular marker for the clinical prognosis of human Pca and a valuable target for diagnosis and therapy of this tumor." Exhibit 7 at 7.

Further, Meric *et al.*, Molecular Cancer Therapeutics, vol. 1, 971-979 (2002), submitted herewith as Exhibit 8, states the following:

The fundamental principle of molecular therapeutics in cancer is to exploit the differences in gene expression between cancer cells and normal cells...[M]ost efforts have concentrated on identifying differences in gene expression at the level of mRNA, which can be attributable to either DNA amplification or to differences in transcription. Meric et al. at 971 (emphasis added).

Those of skill in the art would not be focusing on differences in gene expression between cancer cells and normal cells if there were no correlation between gene expression and protein expression.

Taken together, the declarations of Grimaldi and Polakis, the accompanying references, and the excerpts from several leading textbooks and references provided above all establish that the generally accepted understanding in the art is that there is a reasonable correlation between changes in gene expression and the level of the encoded protein.

Applicants submit that a lack of known role for PRO1003 in cancer does not prevent its use as a diagnostic tool for cancer. The fact that there is no known translocation or mutation of PRO1003, for example, is irrelevant to whether its differential expression can be used to assist in

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diagnosis of cancer – one does not need to know why PRO1003 is differentially expressed, or what the consequence of the differential expression is, in order to exploit the differential expression to distinguish tumor from normal tissue. In fact the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines promulgated by the PTO recognize that proteins which are differentially expressed in cancer have utility. (See the caveat in Example 12 which state that the utility requirement is satisfied where a protein is expressed in melanoma cells but not on normal skin and antibodies against the protein can be used to diagnose cancer.) In addition, while Applicants appreciate that actions taken in other applications are not binding on the PTO with respect to the present application, Applicants note that the PTO has issued several patents claiming differentially expressed polypeptides and antibodies to the same, or methods employing such antibodies. (See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,414,117, U.S. Patent No. 6,124,433, U.S. Patent No. 6,156,500, and U.S. Patent No. 6,562,343 attached hereto as Exhibits 9-12.)

Accordingly, Applicants submit that they have offered sufficient evidence to establish that it is more likely than not that one of skill in the art would believe that because the PRO1003 mRNA is more highly expressed in normal stomach and skin tissue and in lung tumor than in stomach and melanoma tumor and normal lung tissue, respectively, the PRO1003 polypeptide will also be more highly expressed in normal stomach and skin tissue and in lung tumor than in stomach and melanoma tumor, and normal lung tissue, respectively. This differential expression of the PRO1003 polypeptide makes antibodies to it useful as diagnostic and therapeutic tools for cancer.

<u>Claimed antibodies would have diagnostic utility even if the protein were not over-</u> <u>expressed</u>

Even assuming arguendo that there is no correlation between gene expression and increased protein expression for PRO1003, which Applicants submit is not true, an antibody to a polypeptide encoded by a gene that is over-expressed in cancer would <u>still</u> have a credible, specific and substantial utility. In support, Applicants submit herewith as Exhibit 13 the Declaration of Avi Ashkenazi, Ph.D., an expert in the field of cancer biology. Dr. Ashkenazi's Declaration explains that:

even when amplification of a cancer marker gene does not result in significant over-expression of the corresponding gene product, this very absence of gene product over-expression still provides significant information for cancer diagnosis

and treatment. Thus, if over-expression of the gene product does not parallel gene amplification in certain tumor types but does so in others, then parallel monitoring of gene amplification and gene product over-expression enables more accurate tumor classification and hence better determination of suitable therapy. In addition, absence of over-expression is crucial information for the practicing clinician. If a gene is amplified but the corresponding gene product is not over-expressed, the clinician accordingly will decide not to treat a patient with agents that target that gene product.

This is echoed in paragraph 6 of the second Grimaldi Declaration. Mr. Grimaldi explains that:

However, even in the rare case where the protein expression does not correlate with the mRNA expression, this still provides significant information useful for cancer diagnosis and treatment. For example, if over- or under-expression of a gene product does not correlate with over- or under-expression of mRNA in certain tumor types but does so in others, then identification of both gene expression and protein expression enables more accurate tumor classification and hence better determination of suitable therapy.

Applicants submit that simultaneous testing of gene expression and gene product expression enables more accurate tumor classification, even if there is no positive correlation between the two. This leads to better determination of a suitable therapy.

This is further supported by the teachings in the article by Hanna and Mornin, submitted herewith as Exhibit 14. The article teaches that the HER-2/neu gene has been shown to be amplified and/or over-expressed in 10%-30% of invasive breast cancers and in 40-60% of intraductal breast carcinoma. Further, the article teaches that diagnosis of breast cancer includes testing both the amplification of the HER-2/neu gene (by FISH) as well as the over-expression of the HER-2/neu gene product (by IHC). Even when the protein is not over-expressed, relying on both tests leads to a more accurate classification of the cancer and a more effective treatment of it.

The Applicants have established that it is the general, accepted understanding in the art that there is a positive correlation between gene expression and protein expression. However, even when this is not the case, a polypeptide encoded by a gene that is differentially expressed in cancer would still have utility, as would its antibodies. Thus, Applicants have demonstrated another basis for supporting the asserted utility for the claimed antibodies.

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The Arguments made by the PTO are Not Sufficient to satisfy the PTO's Initial Burden of Offering Evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility"

As stated above, an Applicant's assertion of utility creates a presumption of utility that will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, "unless there is a reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope." In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391, 183 USPQ 288, 297 (CCPA 1974). The evidentiary standard to be used throughout ex parte examination in setting forth a rejection is a preponderance of the evidence, or "more likely than not" standard. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This is stated explicitly in the M.P.E.P.:

[T]he applicant does not have to provide evidence sufficient to establish that an asserted utility is true "beyond a reasonable doubt." Nor must the applicant provide evidence such that it establishes an asserted utility as a matter of statistical certainty. Instead, evidence will be sufficient if, considered as a whole, it leads a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the asserted utility is more likely than not true. M.P.E.P. at § 2107.02, part VII (2004) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

The PTO has the initial burden to offer evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility." *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Only then does the burden shift to the Applicant to provide rebuttal evidence. *Id.* As stated in the M.P.E.P., such rebuttal evidence does not need to absolutely prove that the asserted utility is real. Rather, the evidence only needs to be reasonably indicative of the asserted utility.

Applicants remind the PTO that the M.P.E.P. cautions that rejections for lack of utility are rarely sustained by federal courts, and that generally speaking, a utility rejection is only sustained where the applicant asserted a utility "that could only be true if it violated a scientific principle, such as the second law of thermodynamics, or a law of nature, or was wholly inconsistent with contemporary knowledge in the art." M.P.E.P. § 2107.02 III B., citing *In re Gazave*, 379 F.2d 973, 978, 154 U.S.P.Q. 92, 96 (CCPA 1967) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added). Rather than being wholly inconsistent with contemporary knowledge in the art, Applicants' asserted utility is squarely within the teaching of leading textbooks in the field, and is supported by several additional references and the declarations of skilled experts.

The PTO has not offered any arguments or cited any references to establish "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt" that antibodies to a polypeptide differentially expressed in certain tumors can be used as a diagnostic tool. Pennica et al. is irrelevant to the utility of the claimed antibodies as Example 18 reports gene expression data, not gene amplification data. Likewise, neither Hu et al. nor Haynes et al. nor Konopka et al. nor Lewin nor Gokman-Polar et al. supports the PTO's position or is contrary to Applicants' asserted utility. Given the lack of support for the PTO's position, Applicants submit that the PTO has not met its initial burden of overcoming the presumption that the asserted utility is credible and sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement. And even if the PTO has met that burden, the Applicants' supporting rebuttal evidence is sufficient to establish that one of skill in the art would be more likely than not to believe that the claimed antibodies can be used as diagnostic and therapeutic tools for cancer, particularly stomach, lung and melanoma cancer.

Specific Utility

The Asserted Substantial Utilities are Specific to the Claimed Antibodies

Applicants next address the PTO's assertion that the asserted utilities are not specific to the claimed antibodies related to PRO1003. Applicants respectfully disagree.

Specific Utility is defined as utility which is "specific to the subject matter claimed," in contrast to "a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the invention." M.P.E.P. § 2107.01 I. Applicants submit that the evidence of differential expression of the PRO1277 gene and polypeptide in certain types of tumor cells, along with the declarations and references discussed above, provide a specific utility for the claimed antibodies.

As discussed above, there are significant data which show that the gene for the PRO1003 polypeptide is expressed at least two-fold higher in normal stomach and skin tissue and in lung tumor tissue than in stomach and melanoma tumor, and normal lung tissue, respectively. These data are strong evidence that the PRO1003 gene and polypeptide are associated with stomach, lung and melanoma tumors. Thus, contrary to the assertions of the PTO, Applicants submit that they have provided evidence associating the PRO1003 gene and polypeptide with a specific disease. The asserted utility for antibodies to the PRO1003 polypeptide as a diagnostic tool for cancer, particularly stomach, lung and melanoma tumor, is a specific utility – it is not a general utility that would apply to the broad class of antibodies.

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Conclusion

The PTO has asserted several arguments to support its conclusion that based on the cited literature, one of skill in the art would not assume that higher expression of mRNA would correlate with increased polypeptide levels: (1) the PTO has challenged the reliability of the evidence reported in Example 18; (2) the PTO cites Pennica et al. to support its position that gene amplification is not necessarily correlated to gene expression; and (3) the PTO cites Hu et al., Haynes et al., Konopka et al., Lewin, and Gokman-Polar et al., to support its assertion that the literature cautions against drawing conclusions based on small changes in transcript expression levels between normal and cancerous tissue, and that mRNA levels are not predictive of protein levels. The PTO states that further research needs to be done to determine if the increase or decrease in PRO1003 DNA supports a role for the peptide in cancerous tissue. Applicants have addressed each of these arguments in turn.

First, Applicants have provided a first Declaration of Chris Grimaldi stating that the gene expression data in Example 18 are real and significant. This declaration also indicates that given the relative difference of at least two-fold in expression levels, the disclosed nucleic acids and corresponding polypeptides and antibodies have utility as cancer diagnostic tools. Applicants have shown that Pennica *et al.* is irrelevant to the asserted utility, and that Hu *et al.* does not support the PTO's position, and is not contrary to Applicants' asserted utility. Thus, the PTO has not offered any substantial reason or evidence to question the data in Example 18, or the first Grimaldi Declaration.

Second, Applicants have shown that the second Grimaldi Declaration and Polakis Declaration, the accompanying references, as well as the excerpts and references cited above, demonstrate that it is well-established in the art that a change in mRNA levels generally correlates to a corresponding change in protein levels. Haynes *et al.* does not address this issue, and is not contrary to Applicants' asserted utility. Konopka *et al.*, Lewin, and Gokman-Polar *et al.*, are not contrary to Applicants' assertion that generally there is a correlation. Thus, the PTO has not offered any substantial reason or evidence to question these declarations and supporting references.

Third, Applicants have shown that it is not necessary to know what role PRO1003 plays in cancer to use it as a diagnostic tool. The PTO's own guidelines recognize this fact, and

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numerous patents have issued which claim differentially expressed polypeptides and antibodies to the same, or methods employing such antibodies.

Finally, the PTO asserts that there is no asserted specific utility. Applicants have pointed out that the substantial utilities described above are specific to the claimed antibodies because the PRO1003 gene and polypeptide are differentially expressed in certain cancer cells compared to the corresponding normal cells. This is not a general utility that would apply to the broad class of antibodies.

Given the totality of the evidence provided, Applicants submit that they have established a substantial, specific, and credible utility for the claimed antibodies as diagnostic tools. According to the PTO Utility Examination Guidelines (2001), irrefutable proof of a claimed utility is <u>not</u> required. Rather, a specific, substantial, and credible utility requires only a "reasonable" confirmation of a real world context of use. Applicants remind the PTO that:

A small degree of utility is sufficient . . . The claimed invention must only be capable of performing some beneficial function . . . An invention does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs crudely . . . A commercially successful product is not required . . . Nor is it essential that the invention accomplish all its intended functions . . . or operate under all conditions . . . partial success being sufficient to demonstrate patentable utility . . . In short, the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity. If an invention is only partially successful in achieving a useful result, a rejection of the claimed invention as a whole based on a lack of utility is not appropriate. M.P.E.P. at 2107.01 (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, citations omitted).

Applicants submit that they have established that it is more likely than not that one of skill in the art would reasonably accept the utility for the claimed antibodies relating to PRO1003 set forth in the specification. In view of the above, Applicants respectfully request that the PTO reconsider and withdraw the utility rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph - Enablement

The PTO also rejects Claims 1-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Specifically, the PTO asserts that because the claimed invention is not supported by either a specific or substantial asserted utility or a well-established utility, one skilled in the art would not know how to use the claimed invention.

Applicants submit that in the discussion of the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 above, Applicants have established a substantial, specific, and credible utility for the claimed antibodies. To the extent that the enablement rejection is based on a lack of utility, Applicants respectfully request that the PTO reconsider and withdraw the enablement rejection under 35 U.S.C. §112.

Rejection 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph

The Examiner rejected Claims 1 and 6 as indefinite for the recitation of "an antibody that binds" and an "antibody that specifically binds". Claim 6 has been cancelled and Claim 1 amended to recite "specifically binds". Applicants submit that the term "specifically binds" has a well established meaning; since claim terms should be given their ordinary, art-recognized meaning, the rejection is believed to be overcome by the amendment.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) and §103(a)

Claims 1, 2 and 4-6 are rejected under §102(e) as anticipated by Kaser *et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 6,262,247, filed August 30, 1999 and issued July 2001). The Examiner claims that Kaser *et al.* teach a polypeptide, SEQ ID NO:8, that is 100% identical to SEQ ID NO:44, and associated antibodies.

Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as unpatentable over Kaser, et al. in view of Queen, et al. (U.S. Patent No. 6,180,370 filed June 7, 1995 and issued January 30, 2001). According to the PTO, Kaiser et al. do not explicitly teach humanized antibodies, but Queen et al. do.

Applicants submit that Kaser *et al.* does not constitute prior art with respect to the present application. Applicants first disclosed SEQ ID NO:44 in U.S. Provisional Application Serial No. 60/088811, filed June 10, 1998. In contrast, the application for the Kaser *et al.* patent was filed August 30, 1999, well after Applicants' first application disclosing SEQ ID NO:44. The Kaser *et al.* patent does not contain any data correlating SEQ ID NO:8 with any particular disease or physiological function – the passage cited by the Examiner merely states that antibody "that specifically binds PSEQ may be used for the diagnosis of diseases characterized by the over-orunder expression of PSEQ." See paragraph bridging columns 12-13. Thus, Applicants maintain that they were in possession of so much of the invention as is disclosed in Kaser *et al.* prior to the filing date of that application.

The well-established "Stempel Doctrine" stands for the proposition that a patent applicant can effectively swear back of and remove a cited prior art reference by showing that he or she made that portion of the claimed invention that is disclosed in the prior art reference. (In re Stempel, 113 USPQ 77 (CCPA 1957)). In other words, a patent applicant need not demonstrate that he or she made the entire claimed invention in order to remove a cited prior art reference. He or she need only demonstrate prior possession of that portion of his or her claimed invention that is disclosed in the prior art reference and nothing more.

The Stempel Doctrine was extended to cases where a reference disclosed the claimed compound but failed to disclose a sufficient utility for it in *In re Moore*, 170 USPQ 260 (CCPA 1971). More specifically, the patent applicant (Moore) claimed a specific chemical compound called PFDC. In support of a rejection of the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the Examiner cited a reference which disclosed the claimed PFDC compound, but did not disclose a utility for that compound. Applicant Moore filed a declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 demonstrating that he had made the PFDC compound before the effective date of the cited prior art reference, even though he had not yet established a utility for that compound. The lower court found the 131 declaration ineffective to swear back of and remove the cited reference, reasoning that since Moore had not established a utility for the PFDC compound prior to the effective date of the cited prior art reference, he had not yet completed his "invention."

On appeal, however, the CCPA reversed the lower court decision and indicated that the 131 declaration filed by Moore was sufficient to remove the cited reference. The CCPA relied on the established Stempel Doctrine to support its decision, stating:

An applicant need <u>not</u> be required to show [in a declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131] any more acts with regard to the subject matter claimed that can be carried out by one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art following the description contained in the reference....the determination of a practical utility when one is not obvious need <u>not</u> have been accomplished prior to the date of a reference unless the reference also teaches how to use the compound it describes. (<u>Id</u>. at 267, emphasis added).

Thus, *In re Moore* confirms the Stempel Doctrine, holding that in order to effectively remove a cited reference with a declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131, an applicant need only show that portion of his or her claimed invention that appears in the cited reference. Moreover, *In re Moore* stands for the proposition that when a cited reference discloses a claimed chemical

compound either absent a utility or with a utility that is different from the one appearing in the claims at issue, a patent applicant can effectively swear back of that reference by simply showing prior possession of the claimed chemical compound. In other words, under this scenario, the patent applicant need <u>not</u> demonstrate that he or she had discovered a patentable utility for the claimed chemical compound prior to the effective date of the prior art reference.

While these cases discuss the ability to effectively swear back of the cited reference by way of a 131 declaration, Applicants submit that the same reasoning applies here, where the application claims priority back to a disclosure that predates the cited reference. Because Applicants demonstrated, by means of the disclosure in their provisional application filed June 10, 1998, that they were in possession of so much of the claimed invention as is disclosed in the Kaser *et al.* patent prior to its August 30, 1999 filing date, Applicants respectfully submit that this patent is not available as prior art.

Applicants also maintain that the disclosure of humanized antibodies in Queen does not render the claimed invention obvious since there is no teaching or suggestion of antibodies which bind the polypeptide of SEQ ID NO:44 in Queen.

Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejections under 35 USC §102(e) and §103 be withdrawn.

CONCLUSION

In view of the arguments presented above, Applicants respectfully maintain that claims are patentable and request that they be passed to issue. Applicants invite the Examiner to call the undersigned if any remaining issues may be resolved by telephone.

Please charge any additional fees, including any fees for additional extension of time, or credit overpayment to Deposit Account No. 11-1410.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: June 25, 2005

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